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The Oklahoma Corporation Commission proposed regulations to protect 
the state from further seismic activity. Meanwhile, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court tackled the Production Revenue Standards Act and the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, while the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a broad 
definition of a “partnership” for tax purposes. 
II. Regulatory Developments 
On August 18, 2016, the Oil and Gas Conservation Division (“OGCD”) 
of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (“OCC”) announced additional 
measures to combat recent seismic activity potentially triggered by 
saltwater disposal wells in Oklahoma and Lincoln counties.  After recent 
earthquakes near Luther and Wellston, the OGCD required operators of all 
wells within a ten-mile buffer from these two events either shut-in the wells 
or operate at a reduced capacity, depending on their proximity to the events. 
The OGCD will review these actions every 180 days.1 
This action is part of a series of regional responses to seismicity caused 
by oil and gas development; for example, a Regional Volume Reduction 
Plan issued in February and March of 2016 covered western and central 
Oklahoma and regulated shut-in or reduced production from disposal wells 
in that area of the state.2 
III. Judicial Developments 
A. State Cases 
Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc. 
In Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
ruled the Production Revenue Standards Act (“Act”) did not apply to a 
settlement arising from uncompensated drainage from gas wells as opposed 
to actual production.3 
The Act generally regulates the marketing, sale and production of 
minerals, and it imposes a timeframe on operators to pay royalty owners 
their share of production or face interest penalties. The Act entitles royalty 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Press Release, Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Oil and Gas Conservation 
Division, Reduction in Volumes for Wells Located in Area of Interest for Triggered 
Seismicity (Aug. 18, 2016). 
 2. Media Advisory, Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Oil and Gas Conservation 
Division, Regional Earthquake Response Plan for Western Oklahoma (Feb. 16, 2016). 
 3. Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 2015 OK 74, 362 P.3d 205. 
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owners to the “share of proceeds or other revenue derived from or 
attributable to any production of oil and gas that may be attributed to any 
royalty share.”4 
Krug represented a class of people who own mineral interests in a pair of 
640-acre sections in Beckham County. The class leased their lands to the 
defendant, which operated natural gas wells on these lands from 1978 to 
1998.5 
The mineral owners brought suit seeking damages for uncompensated 
drainage of natural gas allegedly occurring between 1982 and 1989; they 
alleged the defendants received payment from a settlement related to 
uncompensated drainage but did not share any portion of the settlement 
with mineral owners.6 Plaintiffs argued the Act entitled them to their share 
of the settlement because the settlement qualified as proceeds or other 
revenue attributable to production.7 
The Court disagreed and referred to Roye Realty & Developing, Inc. v. 
Watson, which defined the word “produced” as discovery of a product and 
extraction of same from the ground; Roye defined “sold” as the point when 
gas enters the purchaser’s pipeline.8  The court ruled the Act does not apply 
because the settlement payment did not relate to any actual production of 
natural gas, and the legislature’s clear intent was for the Act to only apply 
to production, not uncompensated drainage.9 
American Natural Resources, LLC v. Eagle Rock Energy Partners, L.P. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled an agreement granting a party the 
right to participate in all future wells without a timeframe violated the rule 
against perpetuities (“Rule”), and a limited liability company cannot be a 
“life in being” for purposes of Article II, Section 32 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.10 
In 2005, Encore Operating, LP, defendants’ predecessor in interest, 
entered into a letter agreement with American Natural Resources (“ANR”), 
which included an area of mutual interest (“AMI”).  Within the AMI, ANR 
agreed to assign leases to Encore, and Encore would, among other things, 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. ¶ 14, 362 P.3d at 212 (quoting OKLA. STAT. TIT. 52, §570.2(8) (2015)). 
 5. Id. ¶ 3, 362 P.3d at 208. 
 6. Id. ¶ 4, 362 P.3d at 209. 
 7. Id. ¶ 11, 362 P.3d at 210. 
 8. Id. ¶ 19, 362 P.3d at 213-14 (citations omitted). 
 9. Id. ¶ 20-21, 362 P.3d at 214. 
 10. Am. Nat. Res., LLC v. Eagle Rock Energy Partners, L.P., 2016 OK 67, 374 P.3d 
766. 
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drill a test well and “allow ANR to participate in all future wells drilled in 
the AMI at any time whether or not the parties held a current lease.”11 The 
main conflict arises from the Option Provision: “In all subsequent wells 
within the AMI, ANR shall have the right to participate in the prospect area 
with a twenty-five (25%) working interest[.]”  ANR alleged defendants 
completed seventeen wells in the AMI but did not allow ANR to participate 
in any of them.12 
At the district court, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the 
Option Provision violated the Rule.13 The District Court granted the motion 
to dismiss.14  The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and 
remanded in part for a determination of whether life of an organization 
could create an exception to the Rule.15 The defendants appealed.16 
Article II, Section 32 of the Oklahoma Constitution provides 
“perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free 
government, and shall never be allowed[.]”17 In Melcher v. Camp, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted the commonly accepted definition of the 
Rule — “no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.”18 
ANR argued the Rule does not apply to joint operating agreements 
(“JOAs”) because those contracts usually do not include property rights; 
however, the Court noted this Option Provision lies within a stand-alone 
AMI (not a JOA), which does determine the parties’ rights to participate in 
drilling wells, i.e., property rights.19 
Defendants relied on Melcher, wherein the parties entered into a top 
lease for minerals above a 5,500-foot depth split of a certain property.20 A 
separate agreement required “that in the event [the lessors] shall at any time 
have an opportunity to lease the oil, gas and other minerals and mineral 
rights below 5,500 feet, [the lessee] is to be given a five day option of 
acquiring such lease himself on the same terms and conditions offered to 
[the lessors].”21  This Court found that preemptive option violated the Rule 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Id. ¶ 2, 374 P.3d at 767. 
 12. Id. ¶ 3, 374 P.3d at 767. 
 13. Id. ¶ 4, 374 P.3d at 768. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. ¶ 5, 374 P.3d at 768-69. 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id. ¶ 7, 374 P.3d at 769 (quoting OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32). 
 18. Id. (quoting Melcher v. Camp, 1967 OK 239, 435 P.2d 107). 
 19. Id. ¶ 8, 374 P.3d at 769. 
 20. Id. ¶ 10, 374 P.3d at 769-70. 
 21. Id. 
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because the separate agreement would not terminate with the existing lease 
agreement, “the option was based on a condition precedent which might 
never occur,” and “the lessors gave up their right to sell to whomever they 
wanted.”22 
The Melcher Court also noted an exception to the Rule: the option is 
within the lease and is exercisable within the term of the leasehold.23 The 
plaintiff alternatively argued this exception should apply to the Option 
Provision, citing Producers Oil Company v. Gore, wherein this Court 
applied the Melcher exception and ruled a preemptive option did not violate 
the Rule.24  But here, the Court distinguished Producers from Melcher.25 
The Melcher option depended on unleased property and would not expire if 
the leases terminated for lack of production, while the Producers lease 
required the non-operator to give the operator the right of first refusal, a 
task that was impossible if the lease expired and the non-operator lost its 
interest in the leasehold.26   
In this case, the Court decided the Option Provision more closely 
resembled the option in Melcher — it is not part of a JOA or a lease but an 
AMI agreement, and it does not expire when an existing lease expires.27 
The Option Provision affects all future leases executed at any time.28 In 
other words, the Option Provision violates the Rule.29 
The plaintiff, an LLC, also argued an LLC could be a “life in being” 
based on this Court’s ruling in Cartwright v. Hillcrest Investments, Ltd., 
which stated “at the time the Constitution was adopted, the term ‘person’ 
was generally understood to include corporations.”30  However, this Court 
explained that just because a corporation may be a “person” does not mean 
it is necessarily a “life in being.”31 
Under common law, a corporation was not a life in being because it is 
not a human being, and the term intends to measure the human lifespan.32 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. ¶ 11, 374 P.3d at 770. 
 24. Id. ¶ 12, 374 P.3d at 770 (citations omitted). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 374 P.3d at 770 (citations omitted). 
 27. Id. ¶ 13, 374 P.3d at 770.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. ¶ 15, 374 P.3d at 771 (quoting another source). 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. ¶ 16, 374 P.3d at 771.  
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The United States Supreme Court also found that using a corporation as a 
life in being would violate the Rule.33 
Without a measurable life in being, the Rule only permits a period not 
exceeding twenty-one years.34 “[The plaintiff’ right to participate in future 
wells is indeterminable, does not vest within the twenty-one-year limit, and 
may never vest. Thus, the Option Provision violates the rule against 
perpetuity.”35 
B. Federal Cases 
Methvin v. Commissioner 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a partnership existed, 
triggering self-employment tax, when a taxpayer entered into a purchase 
agreement and an operating agreement with an operator.36 
In affirming the Tax Court, the Tenth Circuit explained that a partnership 
depends on the parties’ intent.37 The taxpayer argued his business 
arrangement did not qualify as a partnership because “his working interests 
are not governed by a separate organization” and “he is merely a passive 
investor.”38 However, he had the right to audit the books and inspect 
receipts, legal opinions, drilling logs, and core analyses. He and the 
operator also shared the costs, and the operating agreement described the 
venture as the development of joint property.39 
The court compared these facts to the persuasive case of Cokes v. 
Commissioner.40 Although the taxpayer argued he did not have the 
managerial rights present in Cokes, the Tenth Circuit ruled the Tax Court 
did not clearly err when it deemed the arrangement a partnership and 





                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. (citing Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908)). 
 34. Id. ¶ 17, 374 P.3d at 771. 
 35. Id. ¶ 18, 374 P.3d at 771. 
 36. Methvin v. Comm’r, No. 15-9005, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11659 (10th Cir. June 24, 
2016). 
 37. Id. at *3–4 n.1. 
 38. Id. at *3. 
 39. Id. at *3–4. 
 40. Id. at *4–5 (citing 91 T.C. 222 (1988)). 
 41. Id. at *5. 
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